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SOME RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
RELATING TO NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
By ROSCOE T. STEFFEN*

My principal difficulty this morning has been with regard
to my subject, which is, as the Chairman has stated, that of
Negotiable Instruments. My trouble is with the convention
that what you have to say usually must have something to do
with the subject which you have selected. And it seems I
would like to talk on a number of matters which perhaps you
will think are unrelated to negotiable instruments. Whether
I can make a plausible bridge from negotiable instruments to
those matters is a question. At all events I crave your indulgence.
By way of special pleading I would point out to you that,
as the Chairman states, I have been at Indiana University for
the last two or three weeks, and the weather down there,
while still merely warm, has none the less reached as high as
108 degrees already. It is very difficult to be enirely logical
and coherent at that temperature. Or at least I find it so.
What I would like to talk about in addition to negotiable
instruments-if you determine it is in addition-would be
certain of the recent Supreme Court decisions. I think I can
* Address by Roscoe T. Steffen, Professor of Law at Yale University School
of Law, delivered before the Indiana State Bar Association at Lake Wawasee
July 11, 1936.
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show a connection between negotiable instruments and the
recent Supreme Court decisions,-all without talking politics.
Then I would like also, in the time that I have available, to
say something concerning Mr. Chafee's talk of last evening
relative to legal method and the different approaches to law
now current.
I am more or less forced to take up this last matter for the
reason that the men whom Mr. Chafee criticized-or at least
queried-have all been connected in one way or another with
the Yale Law School, from which place 'I come. Mr.
Llewellyn was a classmate of mine. Walter Wheeler Cook
was a professor of mine at the Yale Law School, and Jerome
Frank was there for a short period as a research associate.
Now, do not be misled, do not understand that I am going
to defend each of these three men. Nor, on the other hand,
do not expect that I am going to defend Mr. Chafee. I will
take still a different position.
I have been in the negotiable instruments field since I
graduated in 1920 from the Yale Law School. After graduation I went to New York for a matter of about four years,
and was associated with counsel for the National City Bank
of New York. If you have any doubts as to what bank the
National City Bank is, you may remember one- Charles E.
Mitchell. He was President of the bank at that time. You
may recall also that, in the late summer of 1929, he made a
statement to the effect that we had reached a new economic
era and that his bank would loan all the money that anybody
wanted on the security of stocks and bonds. He led the individualists in resisting all efforts on the part of the Federal
Reserve to put such brake as it could upon ruthless speculation. But perhaps I should not talk about Charles E. Mitchell,
for it has been said that he knew very little about banking,
much less about negotiable instruments which is my subject
this morning.
It is surprising, in view of their age and respectability, that
there is anything left to say about negotiable instruments.
If you go back to Lord Mansfield-I can not go back to the
time of King James, as the gentleman did just now-but if
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you go back to Lord Mansfield and the seventeen hundreds,
you find a great contribution being made to the law of negotiable instruments. Almost it is fair to say that the law was
written then. Many points which were settled at that time
have continued to be settled, a tribute to the genius of a
great judge. Nor was there any humbug about the law having always existed; it was frankly fashioned to order to suit
Mansfield's economic sense. The philosophy underlying this
development was perhaps as well brought out by Mansfield
himself as by anyone when he said in 1777 that: "I desire
nothing so much as that all questions of mercantile law should
be fully settled and ascertained;" and, as he phrased it, "it
is of much more consequence that they should be so, than
which way the decision is."
But strangely, there have been many developments and
much uncertainty since 1777. With much of this you are
quite familiar. The law in the different states had become
so diverse, in fact, that in 1892, under the leadership of the
American Bar Association, it was decided to formulate a uniform statute. It is an interesting commentary that in spite
of the prestige of the statute it took from 1892 to 1924,
when Georgia adopted the act, before we finally had a uniform statute. That is, before we got what on paper looked
to be a uniform statute. I will have more to say with respect
to that later. All I want to point out now is that in spite of
that codification and its supposed crystallizing effect, there
are still a great many problems which are by no means certain of solution. The law of negotiable instruments has been
growing as has other law.
Now, let us consider just a few of the different questions
which have come up recently. Some of these grow out of
difficulties in the statute, but many I think can best be said
to grow out of a changing economic order. Last year, in December, the United States Supreme Court had a case before
it involving a purchase of bonds. It seems that a brokerage
house in Chicago bought certain bonds from a customer without first consulting its records of lost and stolen instruments.
In fact it had on file a notice from the loser that the particu-
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lar bonds had been .stolen and giving the numbers of each.
The Court then was faced with the problem of, let us say,
negotiability in the broad sense. How far should government
go in this situation to protect the bona fide purchaser?
What-were the precedents? In the early case of Miller v.
Race, Lord Mansfield had said that it is desirable that the
bona fide purchaser of stolen bank notes should be protected.
Perhaps I should make some comments on the philosophy of
that idea. Lord Mansfield seemed to have no doubts of the
desirability of his position. He did not see much point in
going out, moreover, to determine whether his rules worked
in practice, as Mr. Llewellyn suggests doing; he assumed
that they would. Nor did he have any idea that he was ruled
by a father-complex, as Jerome Frank seems to be. But for
the last two hundred years we have seen bonds and bank
notes-note that the case started with bank notes and immediately spread to ordinary commercial instruments-and later
to bonds-being taken away from the holder, whether a
widow, an orphan, a blind person or some other, and have
said simply that it is desirable that the bona fide purchaser
should be protected.
So, here was a bond case before the United States Supreme
Court. The court had all sorts of principles to draw from
to reach a conclusion; the law of Agency is fertile with suggestions as to when notice should be imparted to a principal.
There was precedent, moreover, in Illinois to the effect that
the broker should at his peril take cognizance of the bond
numbers in his files. But there have been precedents to the
other effect. In short, as is usually the case, the decision
turned not so much on an unfolding legal principle-as Mr.
Chafee seemed to suggest last evening-or upon precedent,
as upon a choice between conflicting principles and precedents.
The court decided for the broker, unless it could be shown
that the information was actually in the mind of the particular employee who bought the bonds on the day of purchase.
The result of this case is, of course, to upset a reasonable
effort to protect owners of bonds. Now, what I want to say
is that the decision turned simply on a question of philosophy,
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or politics if you prefer: How far do you want to go to protect one or another element in society? This court said it is
more desirable-you might expect that this court would say
it-that business carry on without interruption, that the bona
fide purchaser be protected, than that we should put him to
the inconvenience of determining whether or not he had information in his files which would have disclosed that these
particular bonds were stolen.
Let us take another illustration. In a case decided about
two years ago, the United States Supreme Court had before
it a question involving which law was to be applied in the
case of a note drawn and payable in Florida, but which was
being sued upon in Pennsylvania. The Pennsylvania and the
Florida courts had disagreed as to the effect under the N.
I. L. of the particular form of interest provision contained
in the note. The question then was, which decision should
the United States Supreme Court choose as the one which it
should follow, or should it do, as the Court did about a
century ago in the great case of Swift v. Tyson, say that it
was free in the interest of building a strong national policythat is in the interest of a uniform law-to take whichever
view it preferred.
The court decided that the law of the place of payment
should control. It next decided, and I think ill-advisedly, that
in order to determine what that law is the decision of the
highest court in the state on the point should control-even
though to do so would be to ignore what might be the prevailing rule throughout the country with respect to that particular
question. And, of course, such a view ignores completely
the effort on the part of the several states to reach by constitutional means a measure of national uniformity in a purely
commercial matter. Again the decision was not dictated by
any single paramount legal principle-unless States Rights
has come to be such-but lay entirely in the realm of choice.
I want to get two or three other illustrations before you
before attempting any generalizations. Let us take next the
position today of the certified check. Here also have been
a number of very much debated questions. Six or seven,

INDIANA

LAW JOURNAL

possibly ten years ago, a man named Manning came into
Barnett Brothers in Chicago and wanted to buy a diamond.
By way of payment he tendered a draft drawn by a St. Louis
bank on a Chicago bank to the order of Manning. Barnett
Brothers decided that before they would hand Manning the
diamond they would go to the Chicago bank and get the draft
certified, which was done. It turned out, however, that Manning had altered the instrument. He had erased the name of
the payee and put in his own name instead. Of course, the
drawee bank was unable to charge the drawer's account, because it had not made payment to the real owner of the
paper. Therefore it re-credited the drawer, and the question
then came to an issue as to whether the bank which cashed
the check, acting for Barnett Brothers, or the bank which
had certified and paid the check should take the loss, a matter
of about $600.
Here again you come to the statute in the search for an
answer. But unfortunately the statute is not precise to the
point. Section 62 says that the acceptor agrees to'pay according to the tenor of his acceptance, but what the tenor of his
acceptance is, is a debatable matter. You may say in accordance with earlier precedent that the tenor of his acceptance
was according to the tenor of the drawing, or you may say
that the tenor of his acceptance is according to the tenor of
the instrument as presented. With the statute ambiguous
the court decided that the acceptance or certification should be
read according to the tenor of the draft as presented; in
other words, the court put the loss on the drawee bank. A
few years later, the California court had the same case presented, and it decided the point in the same way.
Now, as a matter of philosophy, why should the court decide to take a new position here? Are there any guides to aid
a court in reaching its decision, or to aid the lawyer in determining what it will do?
I am sure Mr. Llewellyn offers no solution. You cannot
go and see what has been done in order to determirie what
should be done, that is if you are deciding a new case. I see
nothing in Mr. Jerome Frank's father-complex suggestion
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that could have operated to influence the Illinois Court in determining the result to be reached in the case before it. I
doubt if there is anything on principle, as Mr. Chaffee would
have it, which governed or forced the result. Mr. Walter
Wheeler Cook's insistence that principles hunt in pairs-if
not in packs-has deprived the argument on principle of most
of its supposed power to forecast inevitable results.
Possibly I should make clear right now my philosophy as
regards this matter. This case is a good illustration. It
seems to me that the court like any other governing body
was faced with the opportunity here of making law; that it
functioned just as a legislature does; it had an opportunity of
saying just what a certified check should look like. It decided
that it would make the certified check as nearly like money
as possible. That, in my view, was good legislation. I doubt
if it was controlled by any prior principle. I doubt if most
of the law which has been built up by courts, piece by piece,
has been so much a matter of looking back to principles as
they perhaps would have you believe. At times courts build
new principles. Before I finish I want to make some suggestions as to what should guide them in building those new
principles.
It is interesting in this case to go further and consider what
the bankers did. Well, the bankers, finding that they were going to be obligated on certified checks in situations where they
could not charge the drawer, immediately either waived their
liability by stipulation or decided that they would not certify
checks any longer for the holder. Through one means or
another, therefore, they have practically wrecked the old practice of certifying checks. I, having on the one hand said that I
think this was good legislation on the part of the court, have
to admit that on the other it did not work. The difficultyand I shall speak more of this later-may lie in the fact that
the controlling vote was left with the banker. Bankers like
other people are actuated mainly by self-interest and are often
short-sighted.
Now, if I may leave the certified check case for a moment,
I should like to mention another situation with respect to
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bonds which has caused trouble. The N. I. L. was drafted
in the midst of the 1893 depression. At that time, there was
very little mention or thought of the present day long form
bond. There are some indications, Section 65 being one,
that the bond was intended to be controlled by the N. I. L.
Most of the decisions since the act was adopted have so held.
But the result is that we are now in a situation where we
can not square the modern long form bond with the dictum
of Chief Justice Gibson, which was largely incorporated in
the N. I. L., that a negotiable instrument is a courier without
luggage. The early idea that negotiable instruments function
as a substitute for money no longer fits the case. As a result
we have had a series of awkward decisions trying to bring
the long form bond, and its many conditions and stipulations,
within the strict requirements of the N. I. L. The drive for
negotiability has long since burst the bounds of the early substitute for money rationalization.
I think possibly the only way out of this difficulty is either
to amend the N. I. L. or to go much further and draft a new
uniform investment instruments act. I should like to see such
an act prepared. As it seems to me it should frankly say that
an instrument may be conditional and still be negotiable. Its
value as a long term investment may well be enhanced by
such provisions rather than the converse, and, it must be remembered, we have gone much further with share certificates,
with respect to warehouse receipts and with bills of lading, all
of which have been made negotiable, though in no sense substitutes for money.
I would like to point out, also, if we were to draft such a
statute, that Mr. Chaffee has done excellent groundwork in
discussing the overdue instrument. His point is, briefly, that
equities of ownership should not affect the transfer of a defaulted or overdue bond. This means that a person should
be enabled to dispose of bonds in such case just as freely as
though they were still negotiable; that is, as respects the
equities of ownership, equities of defense arising upon the
issuance of such paper would still be available. Probably
both matters of defense, inasmuch as they are very few today

RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

in the case of bonds, as well as equities of ownership, should
be cut off by negotiation, making the overdue bond fully
negotiable.
There are a number of other points which should be covered by such a statute. I suggest the matter to you as one
requiring study. It has already been brought before the commissioners on uniform state laws and they have reported, but
not yet acted on it. Perhaps I should discuss briefly the case
of the registered bond, since it requires especial attention.
The trouble with the registered bond is that it is not payable
to order or bearer, as required under the N. I. L., but to the
registered holder. Therefore, it is not negotiable, though, of
course share certificates drawn in similar fashion have easily
been made negotiable.
The practical result is that we have either bearer bonds on
the one hand or registered bonds on the other,-registered
bonds selling at a discount of one to two dollars below that
of the bearer instrument. The reason for this discount is
said to be simply that registered paper is more difficult to
transfer. But the further reason, that registered bonds are
non-negotiable, so that you may not get what you think you
have bought in the case of stolen bonds, certainly has an
important bearing on the matter. At all events practically
all bonds are issued today in bearer form. While it was important in Lord Mansfield's day to have bearer paper to act
as currency, there is no reason today for making a bond,
which is a long term investment instrument, in bearer form.
Leave it open to a person to deal in bonds payable to bearer,
if he sees fit, but at the same time develop the order instrument.
Of course, you can see that as far as bankers are concerned,
they are not particularly interested in having a negotiable
order instrument. If they take bonds as collateral, they
prefer to take them in bearer form. They are surer then that
they are holders in due course or bona fide purchasers. From
the standpoint of the issuing corporation, when it pays its
bonds, it is surer to pay to a holder, rather than to a person
who may hold under a forged endorsement. The general
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public who have invested their funds in bonds have nothing
to say, but they take losses running to millions of dollars
annually. All you have to do is note the bank and mail
robberies and the great amount of money tied up in stolen
bonds to appreciate the seriousness of the case. The Supreme
Court decision saying that brokerage houses are not to be
charged with loss notices in their files contributes materially
to make the racket a success.
It seems to me that here again somebody has to take hold
of the matter, whether court or legislature, and force a new
procedure. Quite obviously the thing can not be left to the
self-interested groups now in control. But, now let me refer
to one other matter, and I will have laid before you enough
controversy relative to negotiable paper; enough, that is, for
one morning. This has to do with the collection of negotiable
paper, which has come to be a matter almost as important as
the making of paper negotiable was to start with.
In 1924, the United States Supreme Court in the Malloy
case held that where a collecting bank forwards paper to the
drawee and receives a remittance in the form of a draft, it
takes the risk that the draft may not be collectible. This
was blind application of an agency principle established some
200 years before in the case of individuals. But the point was
of great interest to bankers, for the situation where a remitting bank's draft goes unpaid owing to bank failure was to
come up thousands of times in the next few years. In fact, in
the 12 years preceding March 4, 1933, (no political significance intended as to that date) there were some 11,000 banks
which failed and about $5,500,000,000 lost or tied up in deposits throughout the country.
It is interesting today to read the American Banker's Association Journal as of the time when the Malloy case was
decided. Also let me say to read most of the Law Review
comments on the decision. You will find that the general
counsel for the American Bankers' Association, and various
bankers of prominence, said that the United States Supreme
Court decision was "archaic," not exactly "horse and buggy"
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law perhaps, but archaic, impractical, improper and unworkable. Banking simply could not be conducted on the basis
of the Malloy decision; the customer should be made to take
the loss, not the bank. Incidentally, I might point out that
this was the same Supreme Court which decided the A. A. A.
case, though it has become no longer fashionable to criticize it.
The Douglas case was decided two or three years later.
The Court there ruled that the initial bank should be deemed
to have purchased collection paper for which credit is given
and, therefore, would become responsible on that theory for
collection losses. With that decision the bankers proceeded
to draft what they called a uniform statute, and in that statute they proceeded to provide that they would not be responsible for losses, that they would be agents merely, that they
could forward paper any way they saw fit, and that they could
receive remittance by draft, all without responsibility. They
traded on the good name of the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws by naming their act a uniform statute. In New
York and some other states they even had it adopted as an
amendment to the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law.
Bankers were riding on the crest of the wave at that time,
1928. The statute was adopted in Indiana in 1929. It was
adopted by 9 states in 1929, and by 9 more in 1931. The net
result of the statute was to put the entire loss, not on the
bankers, not necessarily on the depositors, but the whole loss
was in practical effect shifted to the debtor or drawer, the one
man of all the parties involved who was probably least able
to bear the loss. The insurance companies and the large
corporations on whom the loss would seem to be shifted by
the bankers, immediately stated on their receipts that checks
were received conditionally, and that they would not deem
them payment until they got the proceeds in liquid and final
form. Obviously, that pushed the whole loss dear back to
the drawer or debtor on the item.
In December last year the statute came up in Illinois and
was held .unconstitutional. In the preceding year the United
States Supreme Court had held it unconstitutional as applied

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

to national banks. The theory of the statute, as regards protection given to the forwarder, was that collection proceeds
in the hands of a failed collecting bank should be deemed to
constitute a trust fund. The statute in fact was so broadly
drawn that "trust" claims could have been payable out of any
assets of the failed bank, its building or other assets, perhaps
acquired fifty years before the failure. All tracing requirements were eliminated. Obviously such a makeshift "trust"
could not apply to national bank liquidations.
The result is a garbled and highly uncertain situation. Recently, in an article in the Tulane Law Review, I have suggested this as a solution for the problem: Why not extend
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Statute, which
has to do with the guarantee of bank deposits, to include a
guaranty of collection losses as well? As the present statute
stands, it merely covers deposits up to $5,000. If it could
be extended further, to cover collection losses, you would have
accomplished what the Bankers' Code tried to do, and have
done it, I think, on a much sounder basis.
As I visualize the matter of check collections, here at least
the idea of checks as constituting money, currency, has a sure
footing. The check has very largely displaced ordinary currency in settling balances. To have the check subject to all
of the hazards it has been subject to over the past few years
is to make that form of currency compare with the bank note
of the old wild-cat banking days. The ideal should be that
upon deposit of a check with a bank for collection the depositor can treat the resulting credit as cash, subject only to
charge back in the event that the drawer had no funds and
his check was not paid. Matters having to do with the negligence or with the insolvency of collecting banks are inter-bank
affairs, with which the depositor should have no concern.
When this is recognized, we will have made a long step forward, I think, toward making the check a much more desirable
form of instrument, or shall I say, a much sounder form of
currency.
The bankers, however, do not like the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Statute, even though it more than any
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other one thing has restored confidence today. Bankers, if
you recall, are very much like lawyers, they have resisted
practically every measure which has been suggested for their
benefit. You will recall that lawyers have been a little reluctant to adopt changed rules of procedure. Doctors likewise
have not liked to have other people step in and tell them what
they should do. Apparently somebody has to, because if you
leave it to the people most conversant with a matter, they
ordinarily do nothing. They know the ropes, and from their
viewpoint, everything is all right.
Well, I have made something of a picture, I think, to show
that Lord Mansfield would still have a great deal to do, were
he alive today. I could go on with a number of other illustrations indicating uncertainty. But let us look at the thing now
from another angle. What we are trying to do with respect
to negotiable paper, I take it, is to achieve a national economy.
We are trying to make the law uniform throughout the 48
states. It is fair also to say that the N. I. L. is probably our
best example of what can be done by individual state action
to accomplish such a result. Yet, nearly forty years were
occupied in getting the statute adopted by all 48 states. It
has been subject, moreover, to amendment at the hands of
anyone-witness the Bankers Collection Code-who has happened to have an axe to grind. And even though a paper
uniformity has been achieved there has been a good deal of
diversity in interpretation. The Supreme Court on its part
has now abandoned any thought of lending its influence to
promote uniformity of construction. All in all the result is
nothing to be particularly proud of.
May I say also some words concerning the Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws? I do not see that the Commissioners are as effective by any means now as they were in 1892
and '93, when first organized. It seems to me as if the body
has become more of a political organization. It functions
too much now as a nominating committee for the American
Bar Association, which was not a part of the original plan
at all. The work of the Commissioners must be re-vitalized
if we are to proceed toward an effective national handling
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of most of these problems, which, after all, are non-political,
non-partisan, and of a sort which we are all agreed should
be handled as a national affair.
Now, I would like to contrast this fumbling, with something
of what has been attempted in the last few years by the
Congress. There are a lot of other matters besides negotiable
instruments which are to be looked at from a national viewpoint, or which some people at least think should be looked
at in that way. We have had legislation relative to agriculture, relative to the conservation of our national resources,
coal and oil, relative to the sale of negotiable securities,
relative to labor and wage conditions. The effort has been
again-and much more directly-to insure an efficient national
administration of our present economy. These, too, have
become involved in much litigation. So much, possibly, that
the N.I.L. way of doing the thing is no worse than any
other. Certainly I do not propose a constitutional amendment conferring upon Congress the exclusive power to legislate on negotiable instruments, though that would be the
intelligent thing to do, as in the case of most of the matters
just mentioned. Almost I agree with Lord Mansfield that
it is of more consequence that the point be settled and ascertained, "than which way the decision is."
On the other hand, I doubt whether or not the present
Supreme Court, or the present majority thereof, has a very
clear idea of the type of thing that I have been talking for
here, that is, of the need for an efficient administration of
matters which should be uniform or which should be handled
on a national basis. Only a prodigal nation could afford
the waste and loss caused by our efforts to reconcile differences-many of no consequence-growing out of the circumstance that we have 49 separate jurisdictions.
It is interesting to examine the attitude of the Supreme
Court in the recent cases having to do with this legislation.
They purport, as Mr. Chafee suggests the thing is done, to
be applying legal principles. But the difficulty is that there
are at least two sets of such principles, those the majority
use and those adopted by the minority. The result is that
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you must look elsewhere to find the basis for a decision. It
has, of course, been long apparent to lawyers that in such case
you have a government of men and not of laws, even though
our political friends deny this is so. And the question is,
have they legislated wisely? Possibly the question goes
deeper, for has not the court by refusing to define its terms,
as Lord Mansfield would have done, actually been arrogating
more and more legislative power to itself?
The recent minimum wage case in which the Supreme
Court held that Mr. Moorhead, who had violated the minimum wage law in New York, was not to be prosecuted, is
a case in point. It was really a rather pitiful decision. Looked
at from the standpoint of prior cases, or looked at from
almost any angle, the court showed how far it can go toward
substituting its economic judgment for that of the legislature.
The New York Court of Appeals in making its decision purported to follow what the Supreme Court would probably
have done. The Supreme Court refused to re-examine the
grounds on which the Adkins case had been decided, notwithstanding there had been a long development in procedure
since the Adkins case. It is a vicious circle.
The whole result seems to me to grow out of a lack of
national viewpoint on the part of the majority of the present
Supreme Court. That coupled with an emotional obsession
with the notion that they must save the Constitution. I
could make some comments with respect to the growth of
the due process of law concept, but my friend, Mr. Hugh
Willis (Professor of Law at Indiana University), has done
a much better job in his book on Constitutional Law, published last December, than I could do this morning. It
seems very evident, though, that the court in developing
its notion of due process of law has advanced far from the
original idea of what was due process of law, a matter having
to do only with procedure. Where the court got its principles,
where it got its law, lies concealed. It certainly is no part
of the written Constitution.
May I say just a word in this connection as to how Mr.
Justice Roberts construes the Constitution. It offers an inter-
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esting contrast with how Mr. Chafee says decisions are made.
In the A.A.A. case, you will recall, Mr. Justice Roberts
said the thing to do is to put the Constitution down before
you on the table on one side-probably to the right-and
then the statute on the other. Next you read the two and
determine whether the statute conforms. If it does, it is
constitutional; if it does not, it is unconstitutional. He would
make the process out to be really quite simple,-with the
inference, of course, that the minority does not know how
to read. There is no instructor in the United States who
could hold his job and make such a naive suggestion.
Enough has been said, I take it, to demonstrate that this
matter of handling national affairs through Congress, has
run into substantially as much difficulty, owing to the present
attitude of the Supreme Court, as we have run into working
from the other side in attempting to develop a uniform law
with respect to negotiable paper. Apparently there is no
royal road to certainty.
Now, I said at the beginning that I would make some suggestions as to a philosophy or guide by which a court faced
with a troublesome question in the negotiable instruments
field might reach a decision. As usual, I assume it will have
conflicting precedents and various principles before it. At
times it is necessary to look beyond these. I want, therefore,
to lay before you a picture of what has been happening,
almost unobserved, in this negotiable instruments field.
We started out by making bills of exchange and notes
negotiable. That was back in the seventeen hundreds. We
have steadily added to that category warehouse receipts, bills
of lading, share certificates. We have been steadily incorporating in the country a greater and greater number of
corporations. More and more property is being held by
corporations. Now, by reason of having made the share
certificates negotiable, we have made the transfer of what
formerly were fixed assets, an extremely mobile, flexible matter. Again we have developed and sold an enormous quantity of bonds, which are secured by mortgages on various
properties. These bonds as I pointed out a few minutes ago,
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are bearer in form for the most part. They can blow out
of the window and be sold by the finder to a bona fide purchaser, who obtains absolute title. Again fixed assets of
great value have been transmitted into a piece of paper
transferable by delivery alone.
The result has been that enormous values, once fixed in
character, have now become extremely liquid. They are
easily manipulated. I have argued this morning that we
should make registered bonds negotiable. I have suggested
that the certified check should be made an instrument which
would speak as of the date of certification. The point is
that we have never sat down to find out why we want greater
and greater negotiability. We have never analyzed whether
perhaps we should not sooner or later reach a stopping point.
A determination of some of the small questions I have
discussed, for example as to whether a brokerage house should
have notice of loss from information in its files, ought to
be checked against a determination of how our society should
be built. Possibly, that was what the court did. Generally,
however, courts have been too prone to follow precedent or
principle without ever raising their eyes to see what was
ahead of them. After all, what are we gaining by building
up an ever more liquid form of security here which some
people at the top can manipulate to their advantage? The
farmer, who signed some papers when appointed as a lightning rod agent, finds that actually he signed a note, and that
the local bank as holder in due course can require him to
make payment. We have built up a money economy on the
woes of, let us say, the poorer and less educated people. We
do this self-righteously; unquestionably, it is better for business. I think I will close with the suggestion that we should
reconsider the matter very carefully. Possibly it is time to
call a halt to this sort of thing.
As to whether it is or not I have no answer. Perhaps
it is like a number of other things, the present development
with respect to monopolies for example. As far as I can
see we are going to continue to develop more and larger
corporations and the effort to go back to 1890, and the
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Sherman Act, is merely wishful thinking. That is, the movement is going to go on. It has to be controlled somehow,
but you can not turn the clock back.
Now as respects the study of law, do I make my point,
which is: that it is not so much precedent, not so much
principle-and not at all the father-complex-which controls
the new case, but rather that it is a matter of choice. It is
a recognition that law is not merely something foreordained
that unwinds inevitably, just as the tree grows; that within
limits you can make the law the way you want to; that the
courts do make the law the way they want to. It behooves
us therefore to see tha:t that "want-to" should be a carefully
examined "want-to-", and representative of the highest aspirations of the time. This is much more than a mere matter of
hunch or a blind following of principle.

